IT IS TIME TO SHINE A LIGHT ON THE ISLAMIC STATE’S HIDDEN EXECUTIONS
IT IS TIME TO SHINE A LIGHT ON THE ISLAMIC STATE’S HIDDEN EXECUTIONS
A soldier from the Iraqi Security Forces ran out of ammunition in the midst of a firefight with Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) forces in Fallujah, Iraq in May of last year.
After being wounded the soldier was captured by ISIL, paraded around as a prize, and—in a scene reminiscent of the four U.S. contractors killed in 2004—was hung from Employees’ Bridge in Fallujah.
On November 13, 2014, 16 members of the Sunni Arab Albu Nimr tribe were abducted from their homes by ISIL near Tharthar Lake in Anbar province.
With one woman and two children among them, the tribal members were driven to Shtyah area and all were summarily executed by ISIL fighters. Their crime: being related to Sahwa militia fighting ISIL near Hit.
The level of brutality exhibited by these executions is unlikely to shock many. Similar stories of ISIL’s atrocities have been widely reported for over two years now. However, there is a surprising difference between the two events described above.
While the execution of the Iraqi soldier was proudly posted to social media by ISIL, the executions of the family members of Sahwa militia fighters was hidden.
The only reason I can report the atrocity is because of a United Nations mission to investigate human rights violations in Iraq.
What also may come as a surprise is that this pattern of disclosure and non-disclosure of executions follows a distinct pattern by ISIL in Iraq.
The reasons for the pattern may point to an effective way to dissuade people from joining ISIL.
State Department officials remain quite vague on how they are currently countering the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant’s (ISIL) recruitment efforts.
However, the State Department’s website does make it clear that highlighting the contradictions between ISIL’s recruitment messaging and its acts of brutality represents a large part of the counter-recruitment strategy.
But are there further acts of brutality committed by ISIL that, if made public, could possibly dissuade recruits? A quantitative dataset I constructed from five recent U.N. Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) reports covering ISIL’s executions between June 2014 and October 2015 in Iraq helps to answer this question.
The data shows that ISIL is selective about which executions are publicized on social media and which are kept private.
The group publicizes the executions of captured enemy fighters and collaborators on social media, but not those of innocent civilians.
This dissonance between the overall nature of the group’s execution campaign and how it is represented in public could represent an opportunity for the State Department and other organizations seeking to dissuade people from joining ISIL.
Highlighting the executions that are kept private will be more effective in dissuading potential recruits than broadly pointing to all the executions of Muslims as contradictory to ISIL’s branding as defenders of Islam.
Of the 1,754 people executed by ISIL on social media in Iraq between June 2014 and October 2015, 98 percent were captured combatants or suspected of collaboration with the enemies of ISIL.
It should not be surprising to the general public that ISIL believes potential recruits — especially those already sympathetic to the group’s ideology — might be motivated by the executions of those actively seeking the destruction of “the caliphate.”
Social scientists have demonstrated that individuals and even entire societies can be turned homicidal toward other groups seen as threats.
These numbers help explain why the State Department’s video, “Welcome to ISIS Land,” was such a failure — as State Department officials now admit.
By using videos of ISIL’s executions, the State Department intended to show potential recruits that the extremist group is not the defender of Islam, but instead the murderer of innocent Muslims.
Critics argued that the video helped ISIL by bringing more attention to executions the group obviously wanted to be seen in the first place. My findings back up the critics.
Interestingly, however, the number of people executed on social media makes up only 29 percent of the 6,019 people executed by ISIL in my dataset.
So which executions didn’t make it to social media?
Yazidi civilians make up the largest excluded group at 1,218 executions. Family members of (mainly Sunni Arab) Muslim tribes fighting ISIL come in second at 274. The final two groups are women and children at 135 and 14, respectively.
It is tempting to simply conclude that the State Department efforts to counter ISIL’s narrative should focus on highlighting these executions. However, looking deeper into the characteristics of each group reveals some important nuances.
For instance, pointing to the overall genocide of Yazidis will not be very effective. A recent U.N. report on the genocide shows that while ISIL may have not shown these executions on social media, the group has made public
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